Flexible housing recovery program to ensure robustness and sustainability

 

Every post-disaster housing recovery process is susceptible to disruption. Rather than striving for a disruption-proof recovery program, it is more realistic to prepare for various approaches. Construction techniques, methods, and partners can be altered; the only constant is the mission to assist affected individuals in rebuilding safer homes. Given the inevitability of disruption, the key to smooth implementation lies in flexibility. The success of flexible recovery programs hinges on the recovery actor's knowledge, experiences, and networks. 

Those with field experience may be aware of problems that may cause disruption. The issues that usually exist are construction material and builders scarcity, leading to severe local inflation. Moreover, following a disaster event, there would be public infrastructure damages such as collapsed bridges, roadblocks due to landslides, or disrupted public services such as malfunctioning banking systems. Also, sometimes, we must wait for the issuance of the government policy on recovery. More problems may pop up during the process, which needs to be anticipated and prepared for. 

Prior to the program's initiation, it is crucial to adopt a proactive stance and prepare for the worst-case scenario. This includes developing additional programs to run parallel to the housing recovery program, such as strategies to mitigate inflation due to resource scarcity. One viable option is to provide construction materials and skilled builders through a livelihood program. Training local builders and house owners so that they can rebuild by themselves is one of the most effective ways to ensure human resources availability. Implementing a livelihood program that produces and supplies construction material locally, such as making concrete blocks or compressed stabilized earth blocks, can anticipate brick scarcity during the massive reconstruction period.

Additionally, recycling facilities can produce structural elements from salvaged material. These initiatives should be managed by partners and run by a livelihood program. Therefore, it is crucial to involve non-housing agencies as recovery partners as early as possible.

As the local government will spearhead and bear the responsibility for the recovery, it is essential to advocate for their involvement from the outset. Recovery agents are not equipped to address all issues, such as revitalizing public infrastructures, land and property disputes, and, most importantly, supporting the most vulnerable. Every disaster will expose underlying issues within the community. For instance, land boundaries become unclear due to landslides or liquefaction. Hence, there is a need to resolve all land ownership.

Hence, before the program starts, we should have various approaches, modalities, #construction techniques, and partners to ensure robust housing recovery and sustainability. The local communities should be able to continue even after the recovery program ends.

Arwin Soelaksono

Photo credit: Republika. https://news.republika.co.id/berita/rlr5um377/gempa-di-cianjur-dapat-terjadi-lagi-tiap-20-tahun-sekali#google_vignette

Learning from Taiwan Building Resilience

Taiwan has made remarkable achievements in construction quality as proven by the recent earthquake. Though the Mw 7.4 (MMI VIII) earthquake took 13 lives, it saved more lives if it is compared to other incidents. For instance, in Cianjur, Indonesia (2022) Mw 5.6 (MMI VIII) earthquake, the total death toll was 635. Stronger earthquake but fewer casualties.  Both Taiwan and Indonesia, are near the 'Ring of Fire' and are prone to earthquakes. From an engineering perspective, at least there are three initiatives we can learn from Taiwan in protecting their people from collapsing buildings under earthquake load. Those are a strict imposition of building codes, continuous construction market improvement, and innovation.

All requirements in the Building Codes are mandatory to obtain building approval. Furthermore, some requirements mandate some deposit of funds into the government account. There will be consequences if the builders or developers fail to fulfill the requirements as stated in the code. The deposited fund will be confestigated. Therefore, any attempt to save costs should not sacrifice the safety factors by delivering sub-standard construction material or workmanship. This regulation becomes effective since there is effective monitoring and a range of sanctions.

To survive in the construction market, builders and construction industries have not only adhered to the code but also successfully improved efficiency. Through years of improvement, Taiwan’s construction industry was found to have higher labor efficiency than mainland China. Along with the labor, their management and technical capacities are increasing.

If the market continuously improves, it will lead to more innovative construction methodologies and technologies. To reduce the impact, we must deliver robust structures and install elements that may dampen or absorb earthquake load. These elements may be pendulums or base isolation. As installed at the Taipei 101 skyscraper, if the building sways, the pendulum can suppress motion by applying forces in opposite directions.

How can this be applied to housing industries in developing countries? It can be applied, but it should not jump to the innovation. It should follow the natural law. Enforcing the code may lead to improvement in the construction market. This means the whole ecosystem must abide by the code, i.e., homeowners, builders, construction material vendors, and government. There should be country-wide education and training for builders. Sending engineers and skilled builders to rural areas to train local builders. Continuous campaign on build-back-safer and seismic retrofitting. Provision of loans for house repair and retrofitting. Along with the market improvement, there will be fair competition to find better ways to increase safety and reduce costs through innovation. At this point, academia should give their input that the innovation is fulfilling the scientific aspects.

Arwin Soelaksono

Minimizing debris for more sustainable recovery

Minimizing post-disaster debris intended to fulfill #zerowaste principle is achievable if at least 3 parties i.e. housing recovery actors, environmental agencies, and local government could collaborate on developing a preparedness plan. Planning to manage debris after a disaster would be too late and could hamper the recovery process and endanger the environment. Massive quantities of debris suddenly overwhelm the local government and the affected people. For instance, there were 10 million cubic meters of debris in Aceh following the 2004 tsunami. Also, there were 14 million tons of debris waste was generated from the fourteen most affected districts in Nepal following the 2015 earthquake. It took months to clear them. It is also costly, for instance, the cost of handling the disaster debris following Hurricane Katrina exceeded USD 4 billion.

Without a solid integrated plan, all stakeholders tend to work to deliver programs that they feel comfortable about it. Shelter agencies will deliver temporary shelters or support to rebuild houses once the government has a clear plan for housing recovery. Then at some point, the progress will be halted due to debris, including hazardous ones needs to be removed by government-appointed agencies. It might take months due to the debris containing human remains, and hazardous wastes such as asbestos, concrete rubble, wood, and many more. All of those may result in delays, delays will affect costs and lead to inflation, and uncontrolled ruble dumping leads to health problems and environmental issues. 

Hence, shelter/housing agencies, environmental agencies, and local government should develop a plan as a preparedness measure. Shelter/housing agencies should develop plans to maximize the reuse of salvaged material and plan for repair or retrofitting rather than build a new construction. This approach may retain the building material within the area. This will reduce the number of transportation to dump the waste and bring material from neighboring areas. 

The environmental agencies should assist in building the capacity of local entrepreneurs to reuse, reduce, and recycle (3R). Without proper support, people would not have any idea how to manage the pile of rubble and change those into useful materials for reconstruction. Moreover, these activities bring more income for the locals and retain the money circulation in the area. If the initiative can be successful, it might bring a multiplier effect beyond economic activities such as the provision of access to public services such as better education and health facilities. 

The government should endorse those initiatives. The endorsement should be stated in the government policy and budget. Hence, instead of rushing to provide temporary shelter or supporting new house reconstruction, planning on recovery by incorporating environmental principles should be carried out to ensure sustainable recovery.

Arwin Soelaksono

Video: Post-liquefaction area in Palu, Indonesia. 2018.

Collaboration for more comprehensive housing assistance

In supporting the housing recovery post-disaster, extensive funding is often associated with many rebuilt houses. This perception applies to any housing recovery setting. Whether the government or donor-driven leads it or supports to self-recovery approaches, numbers reflect achievements and budgets. It can be seen on the government recovery website, which mentions the names of the aid agencies, the working areas, and the number of houses built. But, just relying on house numbers can be misleading.  Aside from houses, other significant assistance, such as providing access to public infrastructure such as clinics and schools, and primarily to their livelihood, are often vague.

The provision of those mentioned above should be seen as a prerequisite for comprehensive recovery assistance. For instance, the absence of economic improvement will make them unable to extend their house or even repair it if something is broken. In a relocation area, the conditions can be worse; they might leave the housing that governments or recovery actors provided and go elsewhere to places where all infrastructures are available. For instance, following a tsunami or landslide, the government might issue a policy to relocate people in the affected area to safer places. The process of relocation itself might take years to complete. Often, only houses are provided without adequate infrastructure. And on many occasions, livelihood cannot be changed. For instance, relocating fisherman to safer areas that are too far from sea and fish markets will cost them on their daily transportation. Hence, a comprehensive solution should be designed before moving people to a relocation area.

The challenges for on-site recovery and relocation are similar if access is unavailable. Hence, recovery actors’ assistance should not be quantified only by the number of houses built but also by the area that provides a chance to improve living. The problem is that the cost of such recovery will be very expensive for a single recovery actor to shoulder. The need for collaboration with the non-housing agencies will be the solution. For instance, people might be overlooked when including agencies with expertise in land titling to solve ownership issues. Planning to set up a cooperative and new local entrepreneurship initiatives is sometimes discussed during rebuilding progress. On the other hand, those non-housing actors are also challenged to justify their assistance in a humanitarian intervention; mainly, their support is in the development phases.

Comprehensive recovery should be advocated as a preparedness measure; otherwise, establishing collaboration would be too late. The government should lead this initiative and develop a partnership model among recovery actors and non-humanitarian sectors. The opportunity for collaboration should be an advocacy that should be endorsed, resulting in standby mode if disaster events happen.

Arwin Soelaksono

Photo: https://japanesedoodleblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/about-day-of-march-11th-11-years.html 

Promising recovery time-frame

Setting expectations for housing rebuild post-disaster is crucial and should be conveyed to the affected people in the earliest aftermath. However, the government and aid agencies sometimes give their promises under pressure from the public, political parties, and donors. The immense pressure to quickly rebuild happens globally and not only in a particular country. This principle applies to any housing recovery, even in a humanitarian setting; the process cannot deny the nature of construction. It always takes time until the market, which consists of manpower, proper quality of construction material, and financial institutions are in place. To be added to the market is the fully functional infrastructure for supply chain and government systems. Haste recovery will only lead to poor-quality construction, which will eventually stop the process and bring more disappointment to affected people. Moreover, there is a risk that some people might not be included since, due to their circumstances, they are out of the list.

Government and recovery agents should pursue inclusive, build-back-better, and sustainable recovery but should be able to convey that the process needs time. Learn from other recovery; for instance, the recovery from Hurricane Ike in Texas, USA, might take up to 7 years, and more than 10 years for Haiti post-2010 earthquake. Following the 2011 earthquake in Japan, the government planned a 10-year recovery timeframe. During the housing recovery post-tsunami 2004 in Indonesia, the Chief of the Reconstruction program reminded the agencies to have a clear plan for the reconstruction, which can be communicated to the government and their beneficiaries. Conveying only the messages will not be adequate to calm public protest. Hence, recovery pathways should be seen by everyone.

Putting ourselves in the shoes of affected people will shape our priorities on recovery pathways based on their best interests. Hence, wherever possible, supporting their self-recovery would be the best option for sustainability. For those who have land, strengthening their capacities for rebuilding or retrofit, including opening access to financial support, will focus their energy on returning to normal life. This can be achieved through consultations, training, and other activities to engage their involvement. At the same time, governments develop their policy, systems, and infrastructure to enable recovery. These lessons came from governments and recovery agencies who worked in Japan post-2011 earthquake, Nepal in 2015, and Yogyakarta, Indonesia 2006 earthquake.

The biggest issue is those who don’t have land, who live in poverty and other vulnerable conditions, have to live longer in temporary accommodation. There should be additional support for them. It would be unfair if they receive a similar amount or value as others. Improvement in access to public facilities and financial support should be prioritized to secure their job and well-being.

Arwin Soelaksono

Photo: Doga Ayberk Demir/Shutterstock/The Conversation.  https://theconversation.com/turkey-earthquakes-one-year-on-the-devastation-has-exposed-deep-societal-scars-and-women-are-bearing-the-brunt-221819

Resilient community, essential factor for sustainable housing recovery

A resilient community is the key to housing self-recovery post-disaster, but there is no assurance they would rebuild robust structures without external assistance. Hundreds of thousands of houses were damaged when the #earthquake hit some of the villages in Nepal (2015) and in Yogyakarta and Klaten, both in Indonesia (2006). There were similarities in why massive destruction would happen, which were poorly built structures. The unprecedented magnitude of the earthquakes was the test of their construction qualities. Hence, the recovery process should be seen as an opportunity to transform the local capacities. New practices that the community might adopt with new norms should be infused. But this could happen if an enabling ecosystem is in place to strengthen the collaboration of communities, local markets, government, and recovery actors. 

Focusing on the community's capacity to self-rebuild is essential. All external reconstruction assistance is only temporary and would have no sustainability if the community could not be transformed. This also happens in resilient communities. The resilient community eagerly prepared to repair or rebuild their damaged houses soon after the disaster. Once they have money or construction materials, they will do it. The problem persists; no change in construction practices will lead to vulnerable houses being built. Hence, the support should not only be funding but also technical assistance through training and mentoring should be provided. The more resilient the community, the faster and more sustainable the new practices for adaptation. Since the reconstruction process will not be seen as individual efforts but as the community recovery, they will help each other until all houses can be built. 

The solid community can also pressure local hardware stores to sell only appropriate construction materials. As a business practice, local hardware stores will provide building materials to anticipate growing demand. They seek profit from volume; hence, they sell all that people might need, such as steel rebars, cement, bricks, and roofing materials. Since they want to provide a broad spectrum of customers, they sell various construction materials, including those of poor quality. Moreover, they also sell hazardous materials such as those containing asbestos for roofing. Hence, the demand for poor and unhealthy materials can be reduced if the community is solid. Together, they might object to the material being used in their area. On the other hand, the demand for appropriate materials can be increased, and the community can haggle for bigger discounts. 

However, not all communities are solid and resilient. They might behave negatively toward the process and give little interest in having a robust structure as required by the code. They would sacrifice safety for a bigger house that looks good in appearance and costs less. In this kind of community, recovery actors should deploy trained community mobilizers. These community mobilizers should convey messages on the urgency of building safer houses. It would take considerable time to change their mindset. Construction training for local builders and homeowners and mentoring should be delivered during recovery. Once the interest in robust and safer houses is inherent in their norms, they will stay in good construction practices, even if the recovery actors' support is gone. 

Arwin Soelaksono